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ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF MEAN FIELD GAMES WITH SMALL
COMMON NOISE
SARAN AHUJA, WEILUO REN, TZU-WEI YANG
Abstract. In this paper, we consider a mean field game (MFG) model perturbed by small
common noise. Our goal is to give an approximation of the Nash equilibrium strategy of this game
using a solution from the original no common noise MFG whose solution can be obtained through a
coupled system of partial differential equations. We characterize the first order approximation via
linear mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations whose solution is a centered
Gaussian process with respect to the common noise. The first order approximate strategy can
be described as follows: at time t ∈ [0, T ], applying the original MFG optimal strategy for a sub
game over [t, T ] with the initial being the current state and distribution. We then show that this
strategy gives an approximate Nash equilibrium of order ǫ2.
1. Introduction
Mean field game (MFG) is a limit model for a stochastic differential game with large number
of players, symmetric cost functions, and interactions of mean-field type. Specifically, each player
optimizes a control problem whose state process and cost functions depend not only on their own
state and control but also on other players’ decision through the empirical distribution of their
states. Under certain independence assumption, considering the control problem at the asymptotic
regime can reduce this high-dimensional complex interacting system to a fully-coupled forward-
backward partial differential equations (PDEs). The solution of this system can then be used to
approximate the Nash equilibrium solution of the finite player games. This novel idea was first
proposed by Lasry and Lions [30, 31, 32] and independently from an engineering community by
Caines, Huang, and Malhame´ [26].
The MFG problem, with linear-convex setting as will be considered in this paper, is defined as
follows;
(1)


α∗ ∈ argminα∈A E
[∫ T
0
α2
2 dt+ g(X
α
T ,mT )
]
dXαt = αtdt+ σdWt
mt = L(Xα
∗
t )
In the past decades, active research has been done on MFG model with tremendous progress in
many directions. See [21] for a brief survey and [7] for a more extensive reference. Many extensions
of (1) has been considered including a model with major/minor players [6, 17, 25, 35, 36] and a
convergence from finite player games to MFG [5, 20, 22, 28]. An important extension that has
gained a lot of attention is the model with common noise, which is a common Brownian motion
that occurs in the state process of every players, relaxing the independence assumption assumed
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in the original model. This type of model comes up frequently and naturally in many applications
particularly in finance or economics [1,15,23,33] where each player is subject to some sort of common
market factor. MFG with common noise can be formulated as follows;
(2)


α∗ ∈ argminα∈A E
[∫ T
0
α2
2 dt+ g(X
α
T ,mT )
]
dXαt = αtdt+ σdWt + εdW˜t
mt = L(X
α∗
t |F˜t), F˜t = σ(W˜s; 0 ≤ s ≤ t)
The common noise model (2) is more complicated than the original MFG (1). In (1), the lawm0,αt
is expected to be deterministic, so it suffices to seek the optimal strategy along the path (m0,αt )0≤t≤T .
This reduces the problem to a finite-dimensional system of forward-backward PDEs. The common
noise model, on the other hands, is more complex as the flow of players distribution is stochastic.
This means that we need to specify the optimal action for all possible trajectories of the players’
distribution which is infinite-dimensional. One way to solve this model is to add mt as an argument
in the value function. This approach leads to the study of the master equation which is an infinite-
dimensional Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation that encapsulates all the information of the
MFG. See [8,12,21] for some discussions on this approach. Alternatively, one could follow the same
methodology as done by Lasry and Lions. In that case, instead of a forward-backward PDE, the
presence of common noise gives a forward-backward stochastic partial differential equation (SPDE).
Lastly, we can also use the probabilistic approach proposed by Carmona and Delarue [11] which
formulates the MFG as a mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE).
The difference between the two approaches to MFG is from the two different approaches to stochastic
control problems, namely the Stochastic Maximum Principle (SMP) and the Dynamic Programming
Principle (DPP).
Recently, there has been progress in the study of MFG with common noise concerning mostly
to well-posedness results. In [2, 3], the existence and uniqueness result of MFG with common
noise is proved when the state process is linear and the cost functions satisfy a certain convexity
and monotonicity condition. Carmona et. al. [14] gives the existence and uniqueness result of a
weak solution under a more general setting. In [8, 12], the master equation was discussed from the
perspective of both HJB and probabilistic approaches. Under special circumstances, the common
noise model might be explicitly solvable through a transformation which turns the problem to the
original no common noise MFG [15, 23, 29]. Despite these results, a general common noise model
is difficult and impractical to solve numerically or explicitly as it does not enjoy the dimension
reduction property as in the case of MFG without common noise.
The goal of this paper is to consider a MFG problem when the common noise is small as
denoted by the parameter ε in (2). We will refer to this game as ε-MFG. In this set up, we seek an
approximate solution using only the information from ε = 0 problem, i.e. the original MFG with no
common noise or 0-MFG. If we denote by (αεt , X
ε
t ,m
ε
t )0≤t≤T a solution to ε-MFG described above,
then we are essentially interested in the following ε-expansion
(3) αεt = α
0
t + εδ
α
t + o(ε), X
ε
t = X
0
t + εδ
X
t + o(ε)
Equivalently, we would like to study the limit as ε→ 0 of
(4)
Xεt −X
0
t
ε
,
αεt − α
0
t
ε
This paper contributes mainly to the study of the limit (4) and the corresponding first order
approximate strategy. Our main result is to prove that (4) converges to a solution of a system of
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linear mean-field FBSDE whose solution is a centered Gaussian process. While recently there has
been much work on the MFG model with common noise or the convergence of N -player game to
MFG, the asymptotic analysis of small common noise model is new to the best of our knowledges.
Our setting and assumptions are similar to those in [2] where we assume a linear state process, and
convex and weak monotone cost functions, with some additional regularity assumptions.
In addition to the convergence result, we show that the first order approximate strategy (see (3))
gives an approximate Nash equilibrium of order ε2. More interestingly, we show that the game-
theoretic correction in the optimal strategy due to the existence of (small) common noise is not
presented at the first order, and we can simply use the 0-MFG optimal strategy along the trajectory
of the stochastic flow (mεt )0≤t≤T . That is, at time t ∈ [0, T ], we solve the sub-game of 0-MFG over
[t, T ] with the initial being the current distribution mεt . Note that this is different from the 0-MFG
solution itself since we use mεt as the initial at t as opposed to m
0
t .
Our main technical tool is the Stochastic Maximum Principle which turns a MFG problem to a
mean-field FBSDE. The linear, convex, monotone assumptions on the MFG leads to a mean-field
FBSDE with monotone property. A system of monotone FBSDE is well-studied both in the classical
setting [24,37,40] and also recently with mean-field terms [2,3,9] where probabilistic techniques and
standard SDE estimates can be applied. Under this setting, we are able to obtain all the results,
the limits and the estimates, in a strong sense, namely in L2, using similar tools.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we consider a general MFG with common noise
through the Stochastic Maximum Principle and discuss the well-posedness result as well as existence
of the decoupling function all of which will be used in subsequent sections. The main results, namely
the asymptotic analysis of ε-MFG, are given in section 3. We then discuss a connection between
the SMP approach and the DPP approach in section 4. The Appendices contain the proofs of the
main theorems and lemmas as well as discussions on the existence and uniqueness of FBSDE with
monotone functionals and the notion of differentiation with respect to a probability measure.
2. Mean field game with common noise
2.1. Notations and general set up. Fix a terminal time T > 0. Let (Wt)0≤t≤T , (W˜t)0≤t≤T
denote two independent Brownian motions on R defined on a complete filtered probability space
(Ω,F ,F = {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P) augmented by a P-null set. We call (Wt)0≤t≤T the individual noise and
(W˜t)0≤t≤T the common noise. We assume that (Ω,F ,P) is in the form (Ω0 × Ω˜,F0 ⊗ F˜ ,P0 ⊗ P˜)
where (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) is the canonical sample space of the common noise (W˜t)0≤t≤T and that all other
randomness, the individual noise and initial, are supported in (Ω0,F0,P0).
Let P2(R) denote the space of Borel probability measure on R with finite second moment, i.e.
all probability measure µ such that ∫
R
x2dµ(x) <∞
It is a complete separable metric space equipped with a Wasserstein metric defined as
(5) W2(m1,m2) =
(
inf
γ∈Γ(m1,m2)
∫
R2
|x− y|2γ(dx, dy)
) 1
2
where Γ(m1,m2) denotes the collection of all probability measures on R
2 with marginals m1 and
m2. While we assume one-dimensional Euclidean space for simplicity, all the results in this paper
still hold for Rd. Let F˜st denote the filtration generated by W˜r − W˜s, s ≤ r ≤ t and we write
F˜t = F˜0t . Suppose G is a sub σ-algebra of F and G = {Gt}0≤t≤T is a sub filtration of F, then
let L2G denote the set of G-measurable real-valued square integrable random variable, L
2
G(P2(R))
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denote the set of G-measurable random probability measure µ on R with finite second moment, and
H2
G
([0, T ];R) denote the set of Gt-progressively-measurable process β = (βt)0≤t≤T such that
E
[∫ T
0
β2t dt
]
<∞
We define similarly the space H2
G
([s, t];R) for any 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T and we will often omit the
subscript and write H2([0, T ];R) for H2
F
([0, T ];R). We also let M([0, T ];P2(R)) denote the space
of continuous F˜t-adapted stochastic flow of probability measure µ = (µt)0≤t≤T with value in P2(R)
and define similarly M([s, t],R).
For a control α ∈ H2([0, T ];R), let (Xε,αt )0≤t≤T be the corresponding state process
(6) Xε,αt = ξ0 +
∫ t
0
αsds+ σWt + εW˜t
where ξ0 ∈ L2F0 is an initial state. Let m
ε,α
t denote the law of X
ε,α
t conditional on F˜t, i.e.
m
ε,α
t = L(X
ε,α
t |F˜t)
It is easy to check that mε,α = (mε,αt )0≤t≤T ∈M([0, T ];P2(R)) when α ∈ H
2([0, T ];R). Given any
m ∈M([0, T ];P2(R)), we defined the expected cost corresponding to a control α as
(7) J ε(α|m) , E
[∫ T
0
α2t
2
dt+ g(Xε,αT ,mT )
]
where g : R× P2(R)→ R is a terminal cost.
Remark 1. While we assume a quadratic running cost to simplify the notations, the result is
expected to hold under a more general running cost satisfying similar assumptions that shall be
imposed on the terminal cost function g, namely convexity and weak monotonicity.
Now we fix m ∈ M([0, T ];P2(R)) and consider a stochastic control problem with the state
process (6) and the cost function J ε(α|m). We will refer to this problem as an individual control
problem corresponding to m. In the context of a stochastic differential game, mt here represents the
distribution of all the players in the game at time t. We would like to consider how each individual
optimally chooses his/her control given such information. The MFG solution then represents a
Nash equilibrium where every player is optimal given other players’ decision.
The mean field game problem is defined as follows; Find a control αˆ ∈ H2([0, T ];R) such that
given mε,αˆ = (mε,αˆt )0≤t≤T , the optimal control for the state process (6) with cost J
ε(α|mε,αˆ)
defined by (7) is again αˆ. In other words, αˆ ∈ H2([0, T ];R) satisfies
J ε(αˆ|mε,αˆ) ≤ J ε(α|mε,αˆ), ∀α ∈ H2([0, T ];R).
It can be stated succinctly as
(8)


α∗ ∈ argmaxα∈A E
[∫ T
0
α2
2 dt+ g(X
α
T ,mT )
]
dXαt = αtdt+ σdWt + εdW˜t
mt = L(Xα
∗
t |F˜t), F˜t = σ(W˜s; 0 ≤ s ≤ t)
We will often refer to this game as ε-MFG to emphasize the level of the common noise term and
call αˆ a solution to ε-MFG problem with initial ξ0. Observe that the ε-MFG described above can
be viewed as a standard control problem with an additional fixed point feature.
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2.2. Existence and uniqueness of MFG with common noise. Let us first state the assump-
tions on the cost function g
(A1). (Lipschitz in x) For each x ∈ R,m ∈ P2(R), ∂xg(x,m) exists and is Lipschitz continuous in
x. There exists a constant K such that for any x, x′ ∈ R
|∂xg(x,m)− ∂xg(x
′,m)| ≤ K|x− x′|
(A2). (Convexity) For any x, x′ ∈ R,m ∈ P2(R),
(9) (∂xg(x,m)− ∂xg(x
′,m))(x − x′) ≥ 0
Under these assumptions, we can apply the SMP to the individual control problem for a given
m ∈M([0, T ];P2(R)) resulting in the following system of FBSDE
(10)
dXt = −Ytdt+ σdWt + εdW˜t
dYt = ZtdWt + Z˜tdW˜t
X0 = ξ, YT = ∂xg(XT ,mT )
Solving this FBSDE yields the optimal control αˆεt = −Yt. The definition of ε-MFG says that
(mt)0≤t≤T must satisfy the following consistency condition.
mt = m
ε,αˆε
t = L(X
ε,αˆε
t |F˜t)
Adding this condition to (10), we have the mean-field FBSDE corresponding to MFG with common
noise (ε-MFG)
(11)
dXt = −Ytdt+ σdWt + εdW˜t
dYt = ZtdWt + Z˜tdW˜t
X0 = ξ, YT = ∂xg(XT ,L(XT |F˜T ))
Note that the two system, (10) and (11), are different. The FBSDE (10) is a classical FBSDE with
random coefficients from an exogeneous m. The system (11), on the other hand, is a mean-field
FBSDE where it depends on the law of the solution.
We now discuss the solvability of this FBSDE under what we called a weak monotonicity con-
dition on the cost function g. The result below is mainly taken from [2], so we will state the main
assumptions and results without proof and refer the reader to [2] and reference therein for more de-
tail. We also discuss a slightly more general result, the existence and uniqueness of an FBSDE with
monotone functionals, in Appendix A as we will be using such results in our subsequent analysis.
We now state additional assumptions on g.
(A3). (Lipschitz in m) ∂xg is Lipschitz continuous in m uniformly in x, i.e. there exists a constant
K such that
|∂xg(x,m)− ∂xg(x,m
′)| ≤ KW2(m,m
′)
for all x ∈ R,m,m′ ∈ P2(R), where W2(m,m′) is the second order Wasserstein metric defined by
(5). This is equivalent to the following; for any x ∈ R, ξ, ξ′ ∈ L2F
|∂xg(x,L(ξ)) − ∂xg(x,L(ξ
′))| ≤ K(E|ξ − ξ′|2)
1
2
(A4). (Weak monotonicity) For any m,m′ ∈ P2(R) and any γ ∈ P2(R2) with marginals m,m′
respectively, ∫
R2
[(∂xg(x,m)− ∂xg(y,m
′))(x − y)] γ(dx, dy) ≥ 0
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Equivalently, for any ξ, ξ′ ∈ L2F ,
(12) E[∂xg(ξ,L(ξ))− ∂xg(ξ
′,L(ξ′))(ξ − ξ′)] ≥ 0
With the assumptions above, the existence and uniqueness of FBSDE (11) an the ε-MFG follows.
We refer to [2, 3] for more detail.
Theorem 1 (Well-posedness of ε-MFG). Under (A1)-(A4), there exist a unique solution (Xt, Yt, Zt, Z˜t)0≤t≤T
to FBSDE (11). In particular, there exist a unique ε-MFG solution for any initial ξ0 ∈ L
2
F0
.
2.3. Decoupling function, Markov property, and the master equation. A decoupling field
of an FBSDE is a possibly random function which describes the relation of the backward process
Yt as a function of the forward process Xt. When the coefficients in the FBSDE are deterministic,
this function is also deterministic and satisfies a quasilinear PDE. In that case, the FBSDE is said
to be Markovian and we call the function a decoupling function. A decoupling function is useful not
only for solving an FBSDE, the method called Four-step scheme [34], but also for understanding
the connection between the SMP and HJB approach to stochastic control problems.
For ε-MFG, the existence of a (deterministic) decoupling function is not obvious a priori particu-
larly in the case of common noise since for a fixed m ∈ M([0, T ];P2(R)), we are in fact dealing with
FBSDE with random coefficients. However, as the cost function are still a deterministic function of
m, it is plausible to have such property if we include, as an additional input, the current distribution
of players, or in FBSDE context, the conditional distribution of the state process. We state here
such result for ε-MFG which is proven in [3]. We also refer to [18] for more detailed analysis of a
decoupling function for 0-MFG.
Theorem 2. Under (A1)-(A4), there exist a deterministic function Uε : [0, T ]× R × P2(R) → R
such that
(13) Y εt = U
ε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))
Moreover, Uε is uniformly Lipschitz; for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ R,m,m′ ∈ P2(R),
|Uε(t, x,m) − Uε(t, x′,m′)| ≤ CK,T (|x− x
′|+W2(m,m
′))
where CK,T is a constant depending only on K,T .
As a consequence of the Markov property, the ε-MFG solution is in the feedback form; that is,
(14) αˆεt = −Y
ε
t = −U
ε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))
The decoupling function Uε in (13) can be defined through a system of FBSDE as follows. For
(s, x,m) ∈ [0, T ]× R× P2(R), we solve the following FBSDE
(15)
dXt = −Ytdt+ σdWt + εdW˜t
dYt = ZtdWt + Z˜tdW˜t
Xs = x, YT = ∂xg(XT ,m
s,m
T )
where (ms,mt )s≤t≤T is the stochastic flow of ε-MFG over [s, T ] with initial at s = m. Denote the
solution of (15) by (Xs,x,mt , Y
s,x,m
t , Z
s,x,m
t , Z˜
s,x,m
t )s≤t≤T , then Y
s,x,m
s is deterministic and we define
Uε as
Uε(s, x,m) , Y s,x,ms
ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF MEAN FIELD GAMES WITH SMALL COMMON NOISE 7
We refer to [3] for more detail. Similar to the classical FBSDE, it is natural to ask if Uε is a solution
to a certain PDE. It turns out that under certain condition, Uε : [0, T ] × R × P2(R) → R can be
characterized as a solution to the following master equation
∂tU
ε(t, x,m)− Uε(t, x,m)∂xU
ε(t, x,m) +
σ2 + ε2
2
∂2xxU
ε(t, x,m)− Eˆ0
[
∂mU
ε(t, x,m)(Xˆ)(∂xU
ε(t, Xˆ,m))
]
+
σ2
2
∂2mmU
ε(t, x,m)(Xˆ)[ζ, ζ] +
ε2
2
∂2mmU
ε(t, x,m)(Xˆ)[1, 1] + ε2Eˆ0
[
∂2xmU
ε(t, x,m)(Xˆ)1
]
= 0
(16)
with terminal condition
Uε(T, x,m) = ∂xg(x,m)
We refer to Proposition 4.1 in [12] for a related result. Here Xˆ is a lifting random variable, i.e.
L(Xˆ) = m, and ζ is a N (0, 1)-random variable independent of Xˆ both of which are related to the
notion of differentiation with respective to m as described in Appendix E.
This master equation is an infinite-dimensional HJB equation involving the derivative with re-
spect to a probability measure. It was first introduced by Lasry and Lions and was discussed more
extensively in [8,12,18]1. For the case ε = 0, namely MFG without common noise, Lasry and Lions
propose a model in [10] through the following forward backward PDE
(17)
∂tu
0 =
(∂xu
0)2
2
−
σ2
2
∂2xxu
0, u0(T, x) = g(x,m0T )
∂tm
0 = ∂x(∂xu
0m0) +
σ2
2
∂2xxm
0, m0(0, x) = m0(x) = L(ξ0)
where m0t (·) = m
0(t, ·). The first equation denotes the backward HJB equation for the value
function of each players given the flow of distribution (m0t )0≤t≤T . The second equation is the
forward Fokker-Planck equation describing the distribution of players’ state given all the players
adopt the strategy
α¯(t, x,m0t ) = −∂xu
0(t, x)
Under sufficient regularity assumptions on u0, it can be connected with U0(t, x,m) via
(18) U0(t, x,m0t ) = ∂xu
0(t, x)
We would like to emphasize the relation (18) as the terms U0(t, x,m0t ), ∂xU
0(t, x,m0t ), ∂mU
0(t, x,m0t )
are the main terms that will appear in our subsequent asymptotic analysis. The relation (18) means
that the first two terms can be found from the system of PDE (17) describing the 0-MFG. The last
term, which represents the sensitivity of the solution around the optimal path (m0t )0≤t≤T , is new
and will be of crucial importance in the asymptotic analysis.
3. Asymptotic analysis
3.1. Linear variational FBSDE. In the previous section, we have discussed that, under a linear-
convex framework, finding a solution of the ε-MFG is equivalent to solving the corresponding
1In particular, see equation (47) in [12].
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mean-field FBSDE (11), and such system is in fact uniquely solvable under (A1)-(A4). Let denote
its solution by (Xεt , Y
ε
t , Z
ε
t , Z˜
ε
t )0≤t≤T , i.e. they satisfies
(19)
dXεt = −Y
ε
t dt+ σdWt + εdW˜t
dY εt = Z
ε
t dWt + Z˜
ε
t dW˜t
Xε0 = ξ, Y
ε
T = ∂xg(X
ε
T ,L(X
ε
T |F˜T ))
Solving this FBSDE yields the ε-MFG solution by setting αˆεt = −Y
ε
t . From the discussion in
section 2.3, we see that solving the 0-MFG problem for (X0t , Y
0
t , Z
0
t , Z˜
0
t )0≤t≤T requires us to find
U0, which by (18) is reduced to solving a system of PDEs. However, when adding common noise,
we need to solve for Uε, a solution to the master equation (16). Instead of solving this infinite-
dimensional equation, our goal here is to consider the approximation (Xεt , Y
ε
t , Z
ε
t , Z˜
ε
t )0≤t≤T around
(X0t , Y
0
t , Z
0
t , Z˜
0
t )0≤t≤T when the common noise is small. Equivalently, we would like to consider the
limit as ε→ 0 of
Xεt −X
0
t
ε
,
Y εt − Y
0
t
ε
First, we need an additional regularity assumption on g;
(A5). ∂xg is differentiable in (x,m) with Lipschitz continuous and bounded derivative. Denote the
bound and Lipschitz constant by the same K. Specifically for ∂2mxg, they satisfy, for all x ∈ R,
m,m′ ∈ P2(R), and ξ, ξ
′ ∈ L2F with law m,m
′,
(20)
E[∂2mxg(x,m)(ξ)
2]
1
2 ≤ K
E[(∂2mxg(x,m)(ξ) − ∂
2
mxg(x,m
′)(ξ′))2]
1
2 ≤ K‖ξ − ξ′‖2
Remark 2. ∂2xmg involves a derivative with respect to a probability measure. We follow the frame-
work introduced by Lasry and Lions in [10] which is based on a Fre´chet derivative of a lifting
function defined on a space of random variable. See Appendix E for more detail.
Let ∆Xεt =
Xε
t
−X0
t
ε and denote similarly ∆Y
ε
t ,∆Z
ε
t ,∆Z˜
ε
t , then they satisfy
(21)
d∆Xεt = −∆Y
ε
t dt+ dW˜t
d∆Y εt = ∆Z
ε
t dWt +∆Z˜
ε
t dW˜t
∆Xε0 = 0, ∆Y
ε
T =
∂xg(X
ε
T ,L(X
ε
T |F˜T ))− ∂xg(X
0
T ,L(X
0
T |F˜T ))
ε
Formally taking ε→ 0, we get the following linear variational FBSDE
(22)
dUt = −Vtdt+ dW˜t
dVt = QtdWt + Q˜tdW˜t
U0 = 0, VT = ∂
2
xxg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )UT + Eˆ[∂
2
xmg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )(Xˆ
0
T )UˆT ]
where
m0t = L(X
0
t |F˜t) = L(X
0
t )
and Xˆ0 and Uˆ are identical copies of X0 and U in the copied space (Ωˆ0 × Ω˜, Fˆ ⊗ F˜ , Pˆ ⊗ P˜) and
Eˆ0[·] is the expectation with respect to ωˆ0 only. The copied space is used simply to distinguish a
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random variable used to represent a law in the lifting functionals from the original random variable
(see Appendix E for more detail). We can write this term explicitly as
(23)
Eˆ[∂2xmg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )(Xˆ
0
T )UˆT ] =
∫
Ωˆ0
∂2xmg(X
0
T (ω
0),m0T )(Xˆ
0
T (ωˆ
0))UˆT (ωˆ
0, ω˜)dPˆ(ωˆ0)
=
∫
Ω0
∂2xmg(X
0
T (ω
0),m0T )(X
0
T (ωˆ
0))UT (ωˆ
0, ω˜)dP0(ωˆ0)
where we suppress the ω˜ in X0T , Xˆ
0
T as they do not depend on it. One can see that the term
Eˆ[∂2xmg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )(Xˆ
0
T )UˆT ] is a mean field term that couples
{
(Xˆ0T , UT )(ωˆ
0, ·); ωˆ0 ∈ Ω0
}
together.
Note that each path ωˆ0 ∈ Ω0 corresponds a path of an individual player, so in other words, the
mean field term gives the sensitivity to the first order change from all other players. Our first result
in this section shows that this variation process is well-posed.
Theorem 3. Assume (A1)-(A5) hold, there exists a unique adapted solution (Ut, Vt, Qt, Q˜t)0≤t≤T
to FBSDE (22) satisfying
(24) E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
[U2t + V
2
t ] +
∫ T
0
[Q2t + Q˜
2
t ]dt
]
≤ CK,T
where CK,T is a constant depending only on K,T .
Proof. We define a functional G : L2F → L
2
F by
G(ξ) = ∂2xxg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )ξ + Eˆ
[
∂2xmg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )(Xˆ
0
T )ξˆ
]
where Xˆ0T , ξˆ are identical copies of X
0
T , ξ in the copied space (Ωˆ
0 × Ω˜, Fˆ ⊗ F˜ , Pˆ ⊗ P˜) and Eˆ0[·] is
the expectation with respect to ωˆ0 only. Then by (A1)-(A5), it follows that G satisfies functional
Lipschitz and monotone properties. That is, for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2F , AT ∈ F˜T ,
E[1AT (G(ξ1)−G(ξ2))
2] ≤ K2E[1AT (ξ1 − ξ2)
2]
E[1AT (G(ξ1)−G(ξ2))(ξ1 − ξ2)] ≥ 0
The existence and uniqueness then follows from Theorem 1 in [3] (the statement is also provided
in Appendix A). 
We are now ready to state our first main result which establishes the differentiability of ε-MFG
solution with respect to ε.
Theorem 4. Assume (A1)-(A5) hold, let (Xεt , Y
ε
t , Z
ε
t , Z˜
ε
t )0≤t≤T denote the solution to (19) and
(Ut, Vt, Qt, Q˜t)0≤t≤T denote the solution to (22), then there exist a constant CK,T depending only
on K,T such that
(25) E sup
0≤t≤T
[(
Xεt −X
0
t
ε
− Ut
)2
+
(
Y εt − Y
0
t
ε
− Vt
)2]
≤ CK,T ε
2
Proof. See Appendix B. 
We are able to obtain the convergence result above in a strong sense (in L2) mainly due to
the monotone property of our setting. As seen in [3, 24, 37], the monotone property of an FBSDE
enables the proof for existence and uniqueness which relies on the standard SDE estimates and
probabilistic tools. Similarly here, we are able to apply such tools to prove the convergence in L2.
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3.2. Approximate Nash equilibrium for ε-MFG. We have shown that
αˆεt − αˆ
0
t
ε
=
−Y εt + Y
0
t
ε
→ −Vt as ε→ 0
where the limit is in H2([0, T ];R). Using this result, we construct the first order approximate
strategy by
(26) βεt , αˆ
0
t − εVt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
Being a game, an appropriate notion of approximation is required to see if (βεt )0≤t≤T serves as a good
approximation. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that each player adopts this approximate
solution and analyze the gap between the expected cost under this set of strategies and the optimal
cost. For an exact Nash equilibrium, this gap is precisely zero by definition as every player is
optimal given the other players’ strategy. This notion of approximate optimality is called δ-Nash
equilibrium.2 In a finite-player game, it is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Under the same notations as defined in section 2, for the N -player game, a set of
admissible strategies (αit)0≤t≤T,1≤i≤N is called a δ-Nash equilibrium if for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
J i
(
αi|(αj)j 6=i
)
≤ J i
(
β|(αj)j 6=i
)
+ δ
for all β = (βt)0≤t≤T ∈ H2([0, T ];R) where J i(·) denote the cost function of player i.
To go from a finite-player symmetric game to its limit, we formally take N → ∞, assume that
each player adopts the same strategy, and use a single player as a representative player. As a result,
we can define an approximate Nash equilibrium similarly for MFG as follows;
Definition 2. Under the same notations as defined in section 2, an admissible strategy α =
(αt)0≤t≤T ∈ H2([0, T ];R) is called a δ-Nash equilibrium for ε-MFG problem if
J ε(α|mα) ≤ J ε(β|mα) + δ
for all β = (βt)0≤t≤T where J
ε(·) denotes the cost function and mαt denotes the conditional law of
Xαt with (X
α
t )0≤t≤T being the state process corresponding to α.
Remark 3. By definition, an ε-MFG solution is a 0-Nash equilibrium for an ε-MFG problem.
The notion of an approximate Nash equilibrium is important in the theory of stochastic games
with infinite horizon where for many problems, there is no exact Nash equilibrium while there
exists a δ-Nash equilibrium for any δ > 0. It is also a widely used notion in algorithmic game theory
where the main interest is in finding a polynomial time algorithm that yields an approximate Nash
equilibrium solution when finding an exact Nash equilibrium is computationally expensive.
In MFG, this notion is used mainly in the study of the relation between an MFG and a symmetric
N -player stochastic differential game. Recall that the motivation for considering an MFG model
is in its application for finding a good approximate strategy for an N -player game when N is
large. In [11], Carmona and Delarue show that under a linear-convex MFG model without common
noise, the 0-MFG strategy is εN -Nash equilibrium for the corresponding N -player game with εN ∼
O(N−1/(d+4)) where d is the dimension of the underlying Euclidean space. See also [16, 26, 27]
for other similar results. The converse, which asks whether the Nash equilibrium from N -player
game converges to a corresponding MFG solution, is also of interest and is more challenging. For
2It is conventionally called ε-Nash equilibrium. We use the parameter δ here to avoid confusion with the parameter
ε denoting the level of common noise
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interested readers, we refer to [20] and reference therein for results in this direction all of which are
for MFG models without common noise.
In this paper, we are only concerned with the model at the limit with a continuum of players.
We are particularly interested in an approximate solution for ε-MFG using the information from
0-MFG solution. Our main result for this section is the following theorem
Theorem 5. Assume(A1)-(A5) hold. For ε > 0, let αˆε = (αˆεt )0≤t≤T denote the solution to the
ε-MFG and (Ut, Vt, Qt, Q˜t)0≤t≤T denote the solution to the linear variation FBSDE (22). Define a
first order approximate strategy βε = (βεt )0≤t≤T by
(27) βεt , αˆ
0
t − εVt
Then βε is an ε2-Nash equilibrium for ε-MFG.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
3.3. Decoupling function of the linear variation FBSDE. Despite being linear, the FBSDE
(22) is not trivial to solve due to the mean field term Eˆ0
[
∂2xmg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )(Xˆ
0
T )UˆT
]
. Nonetheless,
we proceed in the similar way as solving a classical FBSDE by attempting to find a decoupling
function describing Vt as a function of Ut. Recall that we have a decoupling function U
ε satisfying
the relation
Y εt = U
ε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))
Therefore, we can write
(28)
Vt = lim
ε→0
Y εt − Y
0
t
ε
= lim
ε→0
Uε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))− U
0(t,X0t ,L(X
0
t ))
ε
= lim
ε→0
Uε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))− U
0(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t)) + U
0(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))− U
0(t,X0t ,L(X
0
t ))
ε
= lim
ε→0
Uε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))− U
0(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))
ε
+ lim
ε→0
U0(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))− U
0(t,X0t ,L(X
0
t ))
ε
where the limit is in L2F . The proposition below shows that the first part is in fact zero.
Proposition 6. Assume (A1)-(A4) holds. Let Uε denote the decoupling function of FBSDE (11)
as defined in (13), then the following holds;
(29) lim
ε→0
Uε(t, x,m)− U0(t, x,m)
ε
= 0
uniformly in (t, x,m) ∈ [0, T ]× R× P2(R).
Proof. See Appendix D 
The result above implies that, at the first order, the decoupling function for ε-MFG and 0-MFG
is the same. Combining with the recent result by Chassagneux et al. [18] which proves the existence
of a classical solution U0 of equation (16) with ε = 0, we have the decoupling functional for FBSDE
(22). To apply such result, an extra regularity assumption for g is needed
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(A6). For all m ∈ P2(R), the map (x, z) 7→ ∂2mxg(x,m)(z), is continuously differentiable and
satisfies for all x, x′, α ∈ R,m,m′ ∈ P2(R), and ξ, ξ′ ∈ L2F with law m,m
′,
(30) E
[(
∂z∂
2
xmg(x,m)(ξ)− ∂z∂
2
xmg(x
′,m′)(ξ′)
)2] 12
≤ K (|x− x′|+ ‖ξ − ξ′‖2)
Remark 4. The map (x, z) 7→ ∂2xmg(x,m)(z) is related the notion of derivative with respect to a
probability measure as described in Appendix E. For instance, if f(x,m) = (x −
∫
R
ydm(y))2, then
the lifting functional is f˜(x, ξ) = (x − E[ξ])2, and the Fre´chet derivative is given by Df˜(x, ξ) =
2(x− E[ξ]) = E[2(x− ξ)]. Thus, ∂mf(m)(z) = 2(x− z).
The following theorem gives the decoupling functional for the linear variational process (22).
Theorem 7. Assume (A1)-(A6) holds. Let (Ut, Vt, Qt, Q˜t)0≤t≤T denote the solution to (22), U
0
denote the decoupling function for 0-MFG defined in section 2.3, then
(31) Vt = ∂xU
0(t,X0t ,m
0
t )Ut + Eˆ
0[∂mU
0(t,X0t ,m
0
t )(Xˆ
0
t )Uˆt]
Proof. From (28) and Proposition 6, we have
Vt = lim
ε→0
U0(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))− U
0(t,X0t ,L(X
0
t ))
ε
From Theorem 5.5 in [18], we have that ∂xU0, ∂mU0 exist, and they are bounded by Theorem 2.
The result then follows from Theorem 4 above. 
From Theorem 7 above, we have decoupled the FBSDE (22) and get the following forward
mean-field SDE
(32) dUt = −
[
∂xU
0(t,X0t ,m
0
t )Ut + Eˆ
0[∂mU
0(t,X0t ,m
0
t )(Xˆ
0
t )Uˆt]
]
dt+ dW˜t, U0 = 0
Proposition 6 has a simple yet interesting implication. It says that to approximate the ε-MFG
solution at the first order, we simply need to use the 0-MFG solution applying along the trajectory
(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t)), i.e.
αεt = −Y
ε
t = −U
ε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t)) ≈ −U
0(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))
However, we do not usually know U0(t, x,m) for all (t, x,m) but only U0(t, x,m0t ) wherem
0
t = L(X
0
t )
corresponds to the 0-MFG solution. The full information of U0 at every point (t, x,m) will require
solving the master equation (16) which is infinite-dimensional problem and is non-trivial to do so.
On the other hands, U0(t, x,m0t ) is simply a gradient of a solution of the forward-backward PDE
(17) of Lasry and Lions. So unless we know the function U0(t, x,m), this process means that to
get our optimal control at every time t, we need to resolve 0-MFG problem over [t, T ] with initial
mt = L(Xεt |F˜t) which is computationally expensive. As a result, we need to approximate U
0 at
the current state (t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t)) by U
0(t,X0t ,m
0
t ). In fact, it is not necessary to approximate
at (t,X0t ,m
0
t ) if we can observe X
ε
t . In other words, making use of (29), we can expand around
(t,Xεt ,m
0
t ) instead and get a slightly simpler approximation of αˆ
ε
t as follows;
(33)
αˆεt = −Y
ε
t = −U
ε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))
= −U0(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t)) + o(ε)
= −U0(t,Xεt ,m
0
t ) + εEˆ
0[∂mU
0(t,Xεt ,m
0
t )(Xˆ
0
t )Uˆt] + o(ε)
From both (31) and (33), we see that the derivative with respect to the m-argument of U0(t, x,m0t )
along the direction Uˆt is essential in our asymptotic analysis.
ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF MEAN FIELD GAMES WITH SMALL COMMON NOISE 13
Having established the first order approximation of the ε-MFG solution in the form of a solution
to a linear variational FBSDE, we now proceed to analyze properties of the solution (Ut, Vt)0≤t≤T .
While the FBSDE (22) describing them seems complicated as it involves both the individual noise
and common noise, this is simply a nature of SMP approach as it describes the control in the
open-loop form (a function of path) instead of the closed-loop feedback form (a function of state).
However, if we only analyze the effect of the perturbation by the common noise, or equivalently if
we look at the distribution of (Ut(ω
0, ·), Vt(ω0, ·))0≤t≤T for a fixed ω0 ∈ Ω0, then they are simply a
pair of centered Gaussian process.
Theorem 8. Let (Ut, Vt, Qt, Q˜t)0≤t≤T denote the solution to the FBSDE (22), then (Ut(ω
0, ·), Vt(ω0, ·))0≤t≤T
is a pair of Gaussian process in (Ω˜, {F˜t}0≤t≤T , P˜) with mean zero P0-a.s.
Proof. Recall that F0 denote the σ-algebra in the first component of the product sample space
which is independent of the common noise filtraiton. Let A : [0, T ]×L2F0 → L
2
F0 denote the linear
operator
A(t, ξ) = ∂xU
0(t,X0t ,m
0
t )ξ + Eˆ
0[∂mU
0(t,X0t ,m
0
t )(Xˆ
0
t )ξˆ]
Then we can view (32) as a stochastic evolution equation in L2F0
dUt = A(t, Ut)dt+ dW˜
H
t , U0 = 0
where (W˜Ht )0≤t≤T denote the natural lifting of the common noise (W˜t)0≤t≤T to a Gaussian process
in L2F along the constant direction. That is, if e1 = 1 denote the constant random variable, then
for any ξ ∈ L2F , 〈
W˜Ht , ξ
〉
= 〈e1, ξ〉 W˜t = E[ξ]W˜t
By the uniform Lipschitz property of U0 (see Theorem 2), we have that ‖∂xU
0(t,X0t ,m
0
t )‖∞,
Eˆ0[∂mU0(t,X0t ,m
0
t )(Xˆ
0
t )
2]
1
2 are bounded. Thus, A is a bounded linear functional and hence induces
a strongly continuous semigroup (S(s, t))0≤s≤t≤T : L2F0 → L
2
F0 . Therefore, by the variational of
constant formula (see Theorem 5.4 in [19]) and U0 = 0, we have
Ut = S(0, t)U0 +
∫ t
0
S(s, t)e1dW˜s =
∫ t
0
S(s, t)e1dW˜s
Thus, Ut is a mean-zero Gaussian process with respect to the common noise and the result follows
since Vt is a linear function of Ut. 
4. Connection to Dynamic Programming Principle
In this section, we discuss a connection between the SMP approach and the DPP approach and
present asymptotic results from the DPP approach. Please note that the results here are largely
formal and are intended to give a connection to a more familiar DPP approach.
4.1. FBSPDE for ε-MFG. We follow the same method used to derive the system of PDEs (17)
for the 0-MFG. We will attempt to write the forward-backward equations where the forward one
describes the evolution of the equilibrium distribution through the Fokker-Planck equation and the
backward one describes the HJB equation of the value function.
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Recall from equation (14) that the optimal control of ε-MFG in feedback form is given by
−Uε(s, x,m). We can then define the value function Vε : [0, T ]× R× P2(R)→ R as
Vε(t, x,m) = inf
(αs)t≤s≤T∈H2([τ,T ];R)
E
[∫ T
t
α2sds+ g(X
ε
T ,m
ε
T )
∣∣∣Xεt = x,mεt = m
]
= E
[∫ T
t
Uε(s,Xεs ,m
ε
s)
2ds+ g(XεT ,m
ε
T )
∣∣∣Xεt = x,mεt = m
]
where mεt = L(X
ε
t |F˜t). The value function above represents the minimum expected cost from t to
T given the state of the game at time t (the current state of a player and the current distribution
of all players). Suppose that Vε is sufficiently regular, then by Dynamic Programming Principle, it
can be shown to satisfy
∂tV
ε(t, x,m)−
(∂xVε(t, x,m))2
2
+
σ2 + ε2
2
∂2xxV
ε(t, x,m)− Eˆ0
[
∂mV
ε(t, x,m)(Xˆ)(∂xV
ε(t, Xˆ,m))
]
+
σ2
2
∂2mmV
ε(t, x,m)(Xˆ)[ζ, ζ] +
ε2
2
∂2mmV
ε(t, x,m)(Xˆ)[1, 1] + ε2Eˆ0
[
∂2xmV
ε(t, x,m)(Xˆ)1
]
= 0
(34)
with terminal condition
Vε(T, x,m) = g(x,m)
where Xˆ is a lifting random variable, i.e. L(Xˆ) = m, and ζ is aN (0, 1)-random variable independent
of Xˆ. The derivative with respect to the m-argument is based on the framework proposed by Lasry
and Lions in [10] as introduced in the previous section. We refer the reader to Appendix E and
reference therein for more detail.
The connection between the SMP and the HJB approach for a general stochastic control problem
is well understood. That is, the backward process is the gradient of the value function, at least
when the value function is sufficiently regular. A more general statement can be said in term of
sub/super gradient and a viscosity solution (see Ch.5 in [41] for instance). Similarly for ε-MFG, we
have
(35) Uε(t, x,m) = ∂xV
ε(t, x,m)
This relation can be proved in a similar way by taking Ito¯’s lemma on ∂xVε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t)) and
use (34) to show that it satisfies (11). See Theorem 6.4.7 in [38] for the proof when there is no
argumentm and section 6 in [12] for a generalized Ito¯’s lemma with a probability measure argument.
From (14), (35), we have that the ε-MFG Nash equilibrium strategy is
(36) αˆεt = −Y
ε
t = −U
ε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t)) = −∂xV
ε(t,Xεt ,L(X
ε
t |F˜t))
Let mεt = m
αˆε
t denote the corresponding conditional law, then it satisfies the following stochastic
Fokker-Plank equation
(37) dmε(t, x) =
(
∂x(∂xV
ε(t, x,mεt )m
ε
t ) +
σ2 + ε2
2
∂2xxm
ε
t
)
dt− ε∂xm
ε
t dW˜s
Now we define a random value function along (mεt )0≤t≤T by letting
uε(t, x, ω˜) = Vε(t, x,mεt (ω˜))
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Using the master equation (34), it follows that
duε(t, x) =
(
∂tV
ε(t, x,mεt ) +
σ2
2
∂2mmV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)[ζ, ζ] + Eˆ
0
[
∂mV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)(∂xV
ε(t, Xˆ,mεt ))
]
+
ε2
2
∂2mmV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)[1, 1
)
dt− εEˆ0
[
∂mV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)1
]
dW˜t
=
(
(∂xVε(t, x,mεt ))
2
2
−
σ2
2
∂2xxV
ε(t, x,mεt )−
ε2
2
(
∂2xxV
ε(t, x,mεt )− 2Eˆ
0
[
∂2xmV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)1
] ))
dt
− εEˆ0
[
∂mV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)1
]
dW˜t
=
(
(∂xu
ε(t, x))2
2
−
σ2
2
∂2xxu
ε(t, x) −
ε2
2
(
∂2xxu
ε(t, x)− 2Eˆ0
[
∂2xmV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)1
] ))
dt
− εEˆ0
[
∂2xmV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)1
]
dW˜t
=
(
(∂xu
ε(t, x))2
2
−
σ2
2
∂2xxu
ε(t, x) −
ε2
2
(
∂2xxu
ε(t, x)− 2∂xw(t, x)
))
dt− εvε(t, x)dW˜t
where
vε(t, x) , Eˆ0
[
∂mV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)1
]
Combining with (36) and (37) , we have arrived at a system of FBSPDE
(38)
dmε(t, x) =
(
∂x(∂xu
εmε) +
σ2 + ε2
2
∂2xxm
ε +
ε2
2
∂2xxm
ε
)
dt− ε∂xm
ε dW˜t
duε(t, x) =
(
(∂xu
ε)2
2
−
σ2
2
∂2xxu
ε −
ε2
2
(
∂2xxu
ε − 2∂xv
ε
))
dt− εvεdW˜t
with boundary conditions
mε(0, x) = m0(x) = L(ξ0), u
ε(T, x) = g(x,mεT )
Similarly to the equation (16), we have a verification theorem for (38) which states that if we
have a sufficiently regular solution (uε,mε, vε) to the FBSPDE (38) above, then the ε-MFG solution
is given by
αˆεt = −∂xu
ε(t,Xεt ),
We refer the reader to section 4.2 in [8] for such result. The tuple (uε,mε, vε) then gives, respectively,
the value function, distribution of the optimal state process, and the sensitivity of the valuation
with respect to a spatial shift of the distribution process. Consequently, despite the fact that the
derivation of (38) above requires the regularity of a solution of the master equation, it actually
contains the same information as the master equation. One represents the value function at time t
as a function of (x,m) while the other represents the value function at time t as a function of (x, ω˜)
where ω˜ is a common Brownian motion path. Note also that when ε = 0, as expected, we get back
the system of PDEs (17) of Lasry and Lions.
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4.2. Asymptotic analysis. We now consider the case when ε is small and the approximation of
(uε,mε) around (u0,m0). Particularly, we want to find a pair of random functions (δm, δu) from
the following expansion
mε(t, x, ω˜) = m0(t, x) + εδm(t, x, ω˜) + o(ε)
uε(t, x, ω˜) = u0(t, x) + εδu(t, x, ω˜) + o(ε)
Let us proceed formally. We write
δu,ε(t, x) =
uε(t, x)− u0(t, x)
ε
, δm,ε(t, x) =
mε(t, x)−m0(t, x)
ε
Then from the dynamic of (uε,mε) and (u0,m0) in (38), it follows that
dδm,ε(t, x) =
[
σ2
2
∂2xxδ
m,ε +
(mε∂xu
ε −m0∂xu0)x
ε
+O(ε)
]
dt− ∂xm
εdW˜t
=
[
σ2
2
∂2xxδ
m,ε + ∂x(δ
m,ε∂xu
0 +m0∂xδ
u,ε) +O(ε)
]
dt− ∂xm
εdW˜t
and
dδu,ε(t, x) =
[
(∂xu
ε)2 − (∂xu0)2
2ε
−
σ2
2
∂2xxδ
u,ε +O(ε)
]
dt− Eˆ0
[
∂mV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)1
]
dW˜t
=
[
∂xδ
u,ε∂xu
0 −
σ2
2
∂2xxδ
u,ε +O(ε)
]
dt− Eˆ0
[
∂mV
ε(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)1
]
dW˜t
with boundary conditions
δm,ε(0, x) = m0(x), δ
u,ε(T, x) =
g(x,mεT )− g(x,m
0
T )
ε
Formally taking the limit as ε → 0, we obtain the system of SPDEs describing the ε-correction
terms,
(39)
dδm(t, x) =
[
σ2
2
∂2xxδ
m + ∂x(δ
m∂xu
0 +m0∂xδ
u)
]
dt− ∂xm
0dW˜t
dδu(t, x) =
[
∂xδ
u∂xu
0 −
σ2
2
∂2xxδ
u
]
dt− Eˆ0
[
∂mV
0(t, x,mεt )(Xˆ)1
]
dW˜t
with boundary conditions given by
(40) δm(0, x) = 0, δu(T, x) =
〈
∂mg(x,m
0
T )(·), δ
m
T
〉
where ∂mg denote the derivative with respect to the probability measure and 〈·, ·〉 denote the inner
product in L2. In this case, we are using a different notion of derivative, namely the Gaˆuteax
directional derivative, as it is more appropriate for this approach. We refrain from discussing in
detail here and rather refer the reader to [8] for more detail.
Normally, in the BSPDE or BSDE setting, the diffusion part of the backward process is not
specified and is part of a solution to ensure the adaptedness of a solution. In other words, the
FBSPDE above should be written as
(41)
dδm(t, x) =
[
σ2
2
∂2xxδ
m + ∂x(δ
m∂xu
0 +m0∂xδ
u)
]
dt− ∂xm
0dW˜t
dδu(t, x) =
[
∂xδ
u∂xu
0 −
σ2
2
∂xδ
u
]
dt− δvdW˜t
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and its solution would be a tuple of adapted-process (δm, δu, δv). The FBSPDE (41) is essentially
the first-order correction term of ε-MFG solution from the DPP approach.
To see the connection between the two approaches, we express the stochastic function (δu, δm) in
terms of (Ut, Vt) and the derivatives of U0, the main objects from the SMP approach. The relation
between δu, δv and those from the SMP are clear from the relation ∂xV
ε(t, x,m) = Uε(t, x,m).
That is,
∂xδ
u(t, x) = lim
ε→0
∂xVε(t, x,mεt )− ∂xV
0(t, x,m0t )
ε
= Eˆ0
[
∂mU
0(t, x,m0t )(Xˆ)(Uˆt)
]
The relation between δm and those from the SMP is less straightforward mainly due to a difference
in the notion of derivatives with respect to the law. For a test function φ, we write
〈φ, δm(t, ·)〉 = lim
ε→0
〈φ,mεt 〉 −
〈
φ,m0t
〉
ε
= lim
ε→0
E[φ(Xεt |F˜t)]− E[φ(X
0
t )]
ε
= E[∂xφ(X
0
t )Ut|F˜t]
=
∫
∂xφ(x)um
X0,U
t (x, u)dxdu
=
〈
∂xφ,
∫
R
um
X0,U
t (·, u)du
〉
=
〈
φ,−∂x
∫
R
um
X0,U
t (·, u)du
〉
where mX
0,U
t denote the joint law of X
0
t , Ut conditional on F˜t. That is,
δm(t, x) = −∂x
∫
R
um
X0,U
t (x, u)du.
Appendix A. FBSDE with monotone functionals
We state here an existence and uniqueness result for an FBSDE with monotone functionals. The
result in this section is mainly from [3] with simpler setting. We consider an FBSDE of the form
(42)
dXt = −Ytdt+ σdWt + εdW˜t
dYt = ZtdWt + Z˜tdW˜t
Xs = ξ, YT = G(XT )
where G : L2F → L
2
F is a “functional”. This type of equation covers most, if not all, of the FBSDEs
encountered in this paper. For instance, given m ∈M([0, T ];P2(R)), then
G(X) = ∂xg(X,mT )
corresponds to the FBSDE (10) arising from an individual control problem for a given m. Another
case and perhaps a more important one is when
G(X) = ∂xg(X,L(X |F˜T ))
as it corresponds to the mean-field FBSDE (11) arising from the ε-MFG. The first theorem concerns
the wellposedness of FBSDE (42) when G is Lipschitz and monotone under conditional expectation.
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Theorem 9. Let ξ ∈ L2F and G : L
2
F → L
2
F be a functional satisfying the following Lipschitz and
monotonicity conditions; there exist a constant K such that for any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2F , AT ∈ F˜T ,
E[1AT (G(ξ1)−G(ξ2))
2] ≤ K2E[1AT (ξ1 − ξ2)
2](43)
E[1AT (G(ξ1)−G(ξ2))(ξ1 − ξ2)] ≥ 0(44)
Then there exist a unique adapted solution (Xt, Yt, Zt, Z˜t)s≤t≤T to FBSDE (42) satisfying the esti-
mate: for any A ∈ Fs
(45) E
[
1A
(
sup
s≤t≤T
X2t + sup
s≤t≤T
Y 2t +
∫ T
s
[Z2t + Z˜
2
t ]dt
)]
≤ CK
(
E[1A(ξ
2 +G(0)2)] + (σ2 + ε2)T
)
where CK is a constant depends only on K.
The second result gives the estimate of the solution.
Theorem 10. Under the same assumption as Theorem 9, let ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2Fs and (X
i
t , Y
i
t , Z
i
t , Z˜
i
t)s≤t≤T ,
i = 1, 2 denote the solution of FBSDE (42) with initial ξi, then for any F˜s-measurable set A,
(46) E
[
sup
s≤t≤T
1A∆X
2
t + sup
s≤t≤T
1A∆Y
2
t +
∫ T
s
[1A∆Z
2
t + 1A∆Z˜
2
t ]dt
]
≤ CK,TE[1A∆ξ
2]
where ∆Xt = X
1
t − X
2
t and ∆Yt,∆Zt,∆Z˜t,∆ξ are defined similarly, and CK,T is a constant
depending only on K,T .
The proofs of Theorem 9 and 10 make use of the monotonicity condition in a similar way as
done in a classical FBSDE [37]. The proofs can be found in [3] under more general functionals (see
Theorem 3).
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let ∆Xεt =
Xε
t
−X0
t
ε and δ
X,ε
t = ∆X
ε
t−Ut and define similarly ∆Y
ε
t ,∆Z
ε
t ,∆Z˜
ε
t , δ
Y,ε
t , δ
Z,ε
t , δ
Z˜,ε
t ,
then (δX,εt , δ
Y,ε
t , δ
Z,ε
t , δ
Z˜,ε
t )0≤t≤T satisfies
(47)
dδ
X,ε
t = −δ
Y,ε
t dt,
dδ
Y,ε
t = δ
Z,ε
t dWt + δ
Z˜,ε
t dW˜t,
δ
X,ε
0 = 0, δ
Y,ε
T =
∂xg(X
ε
T ,L(X
ε
T |F˜T ))− ∂xg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )
ε
− ∂2xxg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )UT − Eˆ
[
∂2xmg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )(Xˆ
0
T )UˆT
]
Let
X
λ,ε
t := X
0
t + λ(X
ε
t −X
0
t ), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
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Note that
∂xg(X
ε
T ,L(X
ε
T |F˜T ))− ∂xg(X
0
T ,L(X
0
T ))
ε
− ∂2xxg(X
0
T ,L(X
0
T ))UT − Eˆ
[
∂2xmg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )(Xˆ
0
T )UˆT
]
=
∫ 1
0
(
∂2xxg(X
λ,ε
T ,L(X
λ,ε
T |F˜T ))∆X
ε
t + Eˆ
[
∂2xmg(X
λ,ε
T ,L(X
λ,ε
T |F˜T ))(Xˆ
λ,ε
T )∆Xˆ
ε
t
])
dλ
− ∂2xxg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )UT − Eˆ
[
∂2xmg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )(Xˆ
0
T )UˆT
]
=
[∫ 1
0
∂2xxg(X
λ,ε
T ,L(X
λ,ε
T |F˜T ))dλ
]
δ
X,ε
T +
∫ 1
0
Eˆ
[
∂2xmg(X
λ,ε
T ,L(X
λ,ε
T |F˜T ))(Xˆ
λ,ε
T )δˆ
X,ε
T
]
dλ
+
[∫ 1
0
∂2xxg(X
λ,ε
T ,L(X
λ,ε
T |F˜t))dλ − ∂
2
xxg(X
0
T ,L(X
0
T ))
]
UT
+
∫ 1
0
Eˆ
[(
∂2xmg(X
λ,ε
T ,L(X
λ,ε
T |F˜T ))(Xˆ
λ,ε
T )− ∂
2
xmg(X
0
T ,L(X
0
T ))(Xˆ
0
T )
)
UˆT
]
dλ
=: Iε1 (δ
X,ε
T ) + I
ε
2 ,
where Iε1 : L
2
FT
→ L2FT is a linear functional and I
ε
2 ∈ L
2
FT
. Because ∂2xxg, ∂
2
xmg are bounded and
UT , UˆT are bounded in L
2, it follows from estimate (45) that
E[ sup
0≤t≤T
(δX,εt )
2] ≤ CK,T ,
where CK,T is a constant independent of ε. As a result, we get
E[ sup
0≤t≤T
0≤λ≤1
(Xλ,εt −X
0
t )
2] ≤ CK,T ε
2.
Thus, there exist a constant C˜K,T depending only on K,T such that
E[(Iε2 )
2] ≤ C˜K,T ε
2.
Then by the estimate (45) again, we get (25) as desired. 
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. As we are interested in the asymptotic limit as ε→ 0, we assume without loss of generality
that |ε| < 1. Let αˆε = (αˆεt )0≤t≤T denote the ε-MFG solution, β
ε = (βεt )0≤t≤T be the approximate
strategy defined by
βεt = αˆ
0
t − εVt
where V = (Vt)0≤t≤T is the backward process of the linear variational FBSDE (22). For notational
convenience, we will write J ε(α|β) to denote J ε(α|mβ) for any α, β ∈ H2([0, T ];R) (see section 2.1
for the definition of J ε(α|mβ) and mβ).
For any control α, β(1), β(2) ∈ H2([0, T ];R), let Xα, Xβ
(1)
, Xβ
(2)
denote the corresponding state
processes, then we have
E[(Xβ
(1)
T −X
β(2)
T )
2] ≤ CT
∫ T
0
|β
(1)
t − β
(2)
t |
2dt
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Thus, combining with Lipschitz assumption on g, it follows that
(48)
|J ε(α|β(1))− J ε(α|β(2))| ≤ E
[
g(XαT ,L(X
β(1)
T |F˜T )− g(X
α
T ,L(X
β(2)
T |F˜T ))
]
≤ K(E[(Xβ
(1)
T −X
β(2)
T )
2])
1
2
≤ CK,T
(∫ T
0
|β
(1)
t − β
(2)
t |
2dt
) 1
2
Also, since αˆε is the ε-MFG solution, it is an optimal control of the individual control given
mαˆ
ε
= (mαˆ
ε
t )0≤t≤T . Thus, we have the following estimate (see Theorem 2.2 in [11])
(49) J ε(αˆε|αˆε) + C
∫ T
0
|αˆεt − αt|
2dt ≤ J ε(α|αˆε)
for any α ∈ H2([0, T ];R). Lastly, from the definition of ε-MFG strategy, we have
(50) J ε(αˆε|αˆε) ≤ J ε(α|αˆε)
for any α ∈ H2([0, T ];R). Combining (48),(49), and (50) yields
J ε(βε|βε)− J ε(α|βε) ≤ J ε(βε|βε)− J ε(αˆε|αˆε) + J ε(α|αˆε)− J ε(α|βε)
= J ε(βε|βε)− J ε(βε|αˆε) + J ε(βε|αˆε)− J ε(αˆε|αˆε)
+ J ε(α|αˆε)− J ε(α|βε)
≤ C

(∫ T
0
|αˆεt − β
ε
t |
2dt
) 1
2
+
∫ T
0
|αˆεt − β
ε
t |
2dt


Using estimate (25) in Theorem 4, it follows that(∫ T
0
|αˆεt − β
ε
t |
2dt
) 1
2
= |ε|
∥∥∥∥ αˆε − αˆ0ε − Vt
∥∥∥∥
H2([0,T ];R)
≤ CK,T ε
2
Thus, there exist a constant C˜K,T such that
J ε(βε|βε)− J ε(α|βε) ≤ C˜K,T ε
2
for any α ∈ H2([0, T ];R), |ε| ≤ 1 as desired. 
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Fix (s, x,m) ∈ [0, T ]×R×P2(R), let (Xεt , Y
ε
t , Z
ε
t , Z˜
ε
t )s≤t≤T denote the solution to FBSDE
(15) over [s, T ] with initial Xs = x and (X
0
t , Y
0
t , Z
0
t , Z˜
0
t )s≤t≤T denote the solution to FBSDE (15)
with ε = 0 and ξ = x. Recall that by the definition of Uε (see section 2.3), we have
Y εs = U
ε(s, x,m), Y 0s = U
0(s, x,m)
By the same argument as in Theorem 4, we get
(51) E sup
s≤t≤T
[(
Xεt −X
0
t
ε
− U¯t
)2
+
(
Y εt − Y
0
t
ε
− V¯t
)2]
≤ CK,T ε
2
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where CK,T is a constant depending only on K,T and not on ε, s, x,m, and (U¯t, V¯t, Q¯t,
˜¯Qt)s≤t≤T
satisfies
(52)
dU¯t = −V¯tdt+ dW˜t
dV¯t = Q¯tdWt +
˜¯QtdW˜t
U¯s = 0, V¯T = ∂
2
xxg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )U¯T + Eˆ[∂
2
xmg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )(Xˆ
0
T )UˆT ],
where (Uˆt, Vˆt)s≤t≤T denote a copy in (Ωˆ, Fˆ , Pˆ) of the solution (Ut, Vt)s≤t≤T of FBSDE (22) over
[s, T ], and Eˆ[·] denote the expectation with respect to Pˆ.
Now let E˜[·] denote the expectation with respect to the common Brownian motion (W˜t)0≤t≤T ,
i.e. with respect to P˜. Then since X0t is independent of the common Brownian motion and also
from Theorem 8 which says that UˆT has mean zero, it follows that (E˜[U¯t], E˜[V¯t])s≤t≤T satisfies the
FBSDE
(53)
dE˜[U¯t] = −E˜[V¯t]dt,
dE˜[V¯t] = CtdWt
E˜[U¯s] = 0, E˜[V¯T ] = ∂
2
xxg(X
0
T ,m
0
T )E˜[U¯T ]
Note that zero is a solution to this FBSDE and by uniqueness, it must be the only solution (see
Theorem 2.2 in [37] or Theorem 9 in Appendix A). Therefore,
(54) E˜[U¯t] = E˜[V¯t] = 0, for s ≤ t ≤ T
Combining with (51) and the fact that Uε(s, x,m),U0(s, x,m) are deterministic, we get
lim
ε→0
sup
(s,x,m)∈[0,T ]×R×P2(R)
∣∣∣∣Uε(s, x,m)− U0(s, x,m)ε
∣∣∣∣
2
= 0
as desired. 
Appendix E. Derivative with respect to a probability measure
From the set up of MFG problem, we see that the distribution of player evolves stochastically
and, as a result, some notion of optimization, hence differentiation, over a probability measure is
necessary. In this section, we discuss a notion of derivative for a function with a probability measure
as its argument.
A notion of derivative of a function on the space of probability measure was first defined using
a geometric approach. See [4, 39] for extensive treatments on the subject in this direction. In this
work, however, it is more convenient to use an alternative approach which is more probabilistic in
nature. To the best of our knowledge, this method was first introduced by P.L.Lions in his lecture
at Colle`ge de France, which can be found in Ch.6 of [10]. Since then, many works particularly
those involve MFG with common noise have employed this notion of derivative. While we will only
discuss the results that are relevant to our work here, we refer the interested readers to [13] or more
recently [18] for more detail on this framework.
The idea is based on lifting up a function on a space of probability measure to a function on
a space of random variable. When the space of probability measure we are working on is P2(R),
this method is extremely useful because it allows us to work on a Hilbert space of square integrable
random variable instead of a metric space P2(R). Consequently, we are able to use a notion of
Fre´chet derivative in Hilbert space to help define a derivative on a space of probability measure.
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Let F be a continuous function from P2(R) to R. Let (Ωˆ, Fˆ , Pˆ) be an arbitrary probability
measure space such that Ωˆ is a Polish space, Pˆ is an atomless measure. We call a function F˜ :
L2(Ωˆ;R)→ R an extension of F if
F˜ (X) = F (L(X))
where L(X) denote the law of X . Note that F˜ is a map from Hilbert space L2(Ωˆ) to R, so we can
use the notion of Fre´chet derivative of F˜ to define a derivative of F .
Definition 3. Let m0 ∈ P2(R), F is differentiable at m0 if there exist an extension F˜ and X0 ∈
L2(Ωˆ) such that L(X0) = m0 and F˜ is Fre´chet differentiable at X0.
Suppose F˜ is Fre´chet differentiable at X0, then by Reiz Representation Theorem, there exist
DF (X0) ∈ L2(Ωˆ) such that
lim
Y→0
|F˜ (X0 + Y )− F˜ (X0)− Eˆ[DF˜ (X0)Y ]|
‖Y ‖2
= 0
where ‖ · ‖2 denote the L2(Ωˆ) norm.
It can be shown (see Theorem 6.2 of [10]) that the law of DF˜ (X0) is independent of the choice of
lifting X0. In addition, it can also be shown (see Theorem 6.5 of [10]) that there exist h ∈ L2m0(R,R)
uniquely definedm0-almost everywhere such that for any lifting choiceX0, DF˜ (X0) = h(X0). Thus,
it is natural to define this function h ∈ L2m0(R,R) to be the derivative of F with respect to m at
m = m0.
Definition 4. The derivative of F with respect to m at m = m0, denoted by ∂mF (m0), is a
measurable function from R→ R such that
lim
Y→0
F (L(X0 + Y ))− F (L(X0))− Eˆ[∂mF (m0)(X0)Y ]
‖Y ‖2
→ 0
for any X0, Y ∈ L2(Ωˆ) with L(X0) = m0
E.1. Stochastic flow of probability measure and conditional law. In the context of MFG
with common noise, we will be dealing with a stochastic flow of probability measurem = (mt)0≤t≤T ∈
M([0, T ];P2(R)), which is the law conditional on F˜t of a state process
Xt = ξ0 +
∫ t
0
αtdt+ σWt + εW˜t, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
where ξ0 ∈ L2F0 , α ∈ H
2([0, T ];R). To take a derivative using the notion described above at
mt = L(Xt|F˜t), we need to find a random variable to represent such law. The obvious choice is
simply the state process Xt itself. As we are dealing with a conditional law, so to do the lifting
in an explicit manner, we first need to separate the path space for the individual noise and the
common noise. We assume that (Ω,F ,P) is in the form (Ω0 × Ω˜,F0 ⊗ F˜ ,P0 ⊗ P˜) where the
individual noise (Wt)0≤t≤T and common noise (W˜t)0≤t≤T are supported in the space (Ω
0,F0,P0)
and (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) respectively. We will also assume that (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜) is the canonical sample space of
the Brownian motion (W˜t)0≤t≤T . To avoid confusion between the lifting space and the original
space, we will let (Ωˆ0, Fˆ0, Pˆ0) denote a copy of (Ω0,F0,P0) and Yˆt ∈ L2(Ωˆ0 × Ω˜;R) denote the
copy of Yt ∈ L2(Ω;R) = L2(Ω0 × Ω˜;R) sharing the same common noise for any random variable
Yt. We will use this “hat” notation throughout the paper when using the derivative with respect
to a probability measure in the context of MFG with common noise.
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